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The fundamental purpose of this degree paper is to analyze
the pattern of sick leave usage in the City of Atlanta and to
determine the effectiveness of the City's sick leave bonus plan
(SLBP) as an incentive to conserve sick leave since its incep¬
tion in 1970 with greater emphasis on the last five years:
1978-1982. To achieve this purpose, this study will attempt
to address the following questions; (1) Does the City of
Atlanta have a sick leave abuse problem? (2) Is the sick
leave bonus program effective in controlling sick leave abuse?
(3) Are there more cost-effective alternatives the city can
implement to control or reduce sick leave abuse? (4) Should
the sick leave bonus program be modified, discontinued alto¬
gether or maintained in its current form?
Some of the factors that the study will consider in
answering these questions are; (1) the City's sick leave
usage among city employees and its impact on the government's
operations, (2) the City's sick leave policies and procedures,
(3) the effectiveness of the City's sick leave bonus plan as a
disincentive to sick leave usage, and (4) alternative programs
for controlling sick leave abuse.
The main sources of information are surveys, question¬
naires, an analysis of city sick leave usage and bonus participa¬
tion data, and a review of city documents, ordinances, reports,
sick leave and various periodicals on sick leave usage, abuse,
incentive, and disciplinary programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The City of Atlanta, similar to most major cities at
this time, is undergoing a period of fiscal retrenchment.
This compels the city to seek ways to reduce its cost, where
possible, while simultaneously continuing to maintain an ade¬
quate level of services for its citizens. The first priority
for these reductions should be programs whose effectiveness
is suspect and/or whose objectives can be achieved through
more cost-effective alternatives. The writer believes the
Sick Leave Bonus Plan (SLBP) is such a program and therefore
has undertaken a study of it.
The current sick leave bonus program in the City of
Atlanta was instituted in 1970 to reduce absenteeism attributed
to sick leave abuse and to encourage employees to conserve
their sick leave for prolonged illness.^ However, the extent
to which the program has been successful in achieving these
objectives is questionable. An analysis done by the Bureau of
Budget Policy and Evaluation (now Management Audit) in 1978, in
which sick leave usage and bonus participation data for 1975,
1976 and 1977 were examined, concluded that the program was not
achieving its objectives and should be discontinued in favor of
better administration and control. Another examination of the
^Charter and Code, City of Atlanta, Georgia (Tallahasse,
Florida; Municipal Code Corporation, August 1981), pp. 5-40.
1
2
program in 1980 by the Bureau of Motor Transport Services,
as part of its sick leave program, suggested that the SLBP
be altered to accelerate the time an employee may be reward¬
ed for good attendance. Currently, an employee must have
near perfect attendance for three consecutive years before
he or she is eligible for the SLBP. The SLBP, however, is
still in existence in its original form. The cost is esti¬
mated to fluctuate between $300,000 and $400,000 per year,
and its affect on sick leave use is considered to be negli¬
gible at best.^
2i982 Printouts for the City of Atlanta's Sick Leave
Usage and Bonus Participantion Supplied by the Management
Systems Office, p. 112.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
The precise problem to be dealt with in this study
is: to what extent has the sick leave bonus plan in the City
of Atlanta served as an effective tool in controlling high
sick leave use by City employees.
Except for fire Services personnel, all City of
Atlanta's officers and employees who are eligible to earn
3
annual leave are also eligible to earn sick leave. The sick
leave is earned at a rate of one-fourth day for each five day
period of paid services or at a maximum of thirteen days per
year. Unused portions of this sick leave may be carried for¬
ward each year by the employee until thirty days are accumu-
4
lated. After which time, the employee receives a cash pay¬
ment (bonus) for one-fourth of the sick leave days accumulated
in excess of thirty days based on his or her rate of pay. The
remaining three-fourths of sick leave in excess of the thirty
days are added to a sick leave reserve fund for the employee
which cannot be accessed until the thirty days of sick leave
5
have been exhausted. In case of emergencies, officers and
3





employees who have exhausted all their accumulated sick days
(both the thirty days base and the reserve fund) as well as
annual leave because of protracted illness, may be advanced
sick leave days.^
Under the current sick leave bonus program, sick leave
may be used for a variety of reasons. They range from personal
illness or injury of employee, to the death or illness of a
7
member of the employee's immediate family. To be granted
sick leave with pay, an employee must notify his or her im¬
mediate supervisor or department head within a certain time
period before or after the employee is scheduled to begin work.
Failure to give such notice may result in the forfeiture of pay
0
for sick leave taken until notice is received. In most in¬
stances, an employee's use of sick leave is unquestionable.
However, there are some circvimstances in which an employee may
be required to document sick leave with a medical certificate
from a licensed physician. They include: (1) sick leave
usage of three or more consecutive working days, except in
public safety; (2) request for sick leave when an employee is
on vacation; and (3) frequent or habitual use of sick leave,
providing that an employee has been warned that a medical cer-
9






Agency and Unit Description
The writer served as an intern in the Office of Budget,
Audit and Management (OBAM), the City of Atlanta, from
September 1982 to March 1983. The OBAM is composed of three
divisions which report to the Director of the Office, who in
turn is directly responsible to the Mayor.The three divi¬
sions are:
(1) Management Audit Division, responsi-
sible for conducting management and
operational audits of City operations,
reviews of how well departments or
bureaus are performing;
(2) Budget Division, Responsible for bud-
get preparation and administration;
and
(3) Management Systems Division, Respon¬
sible to ensure that the Mayor has the
kind of information necessary to make
wisely the decisions required.H
Duties and Responsibilities of Intern
As an intern in the Office of Budget, Audit and Manage¬
ment, the City of Atlanta, the writer served as an Assistant
Administrator/Management Analyst for the Management Audit
Division. His main task was to conduct a study of the City
of Atlanta's Sick Leave Bonus Plan (SLBP) to determine its
effectiveness as an incentive for City employees to conserve
their sick days. Also, the writer was periodically assigned
to other jobs as deemed necessary by his supervisor. Among




analyzing their results, (b) visiting City parks and recrea¬
tion centers and assessing their standards, (c) writing and
replying memoranda, and (d) carrying out regular clerical
duties.
Statement of the Problem
First, the City of Atlanta's sick leave program costs
more to implement than most cities and local governments sur¬
veyed due to the fact that employees use more sick days. For
instance, in 1981, Atlanta's program cost $242.00 per employ¬
ee to implement, while Detroit's cost $176.01, Minneapolis
12
cost is $104.10, and Denver cost $206.89. Second, the
City's sick leave bonus plan has failed to provide any incen¬
tive for new employees in the lower salary ranges to save
their sick days. Since the inception of the program in 1970,
the City has paid out over $4,210,730 in bonus to approxi-
mately 28,734 employees. Finally, from examining the data
provided by city departments and agencies with respect to
sick leave administration-management practices and procedures,
one can infer that no consistency exists among departments
and agencies, and that the procedures being implemented are
inadequate for the purpose of monitoring and/or controlling
14
sick leave use.
1982 Survey of Twenty-six Other Local Governments
On Their Sick Leave Practices and Experience.
13
1982 Printouts for the City of Atlanta's Sick Leave
Usage and Bonus Participation Supplied by the Management
Systems Office, pp. 114-118.
Ibid., pp. 120-122.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Numerous studies and writings have been published con¬
cerning sick leave usage and abuse in both private and pub¬
lic organizations. Its increasing attention has emerged as
a result of the problems associated with absenteeism to
organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and goal attain¬
ment. According to Department of Labor Data Survey, the
total amount of scheduled work hours lost because of absen¬
teeism for all full-time, non-farm employees has remained in
the proximity of 3.5 percent since 1957.^^ About two-thirds
of all absences are due to illness and injury, and about
one-third are due to personal and civic reasons.
The economic consequences of lost worktime are indeed
staggering. Nationally, over $26 billion a year is spent on
absenteeism, resulting from lost wages and salaries, fringe
benefits, increased overtime, and the often-sizeable costs
16associated with the use of temporary replacement personnel.
Loretta M. Schmitz and Herbert G. Heneman III, in their
article "Do Positive Reinforcement Programs Reduce Employee
Absenteeism?" state that reducing absenteeism is
1 5
Frank E. Kuzmits, "No Fault: A New Strategy For
Absenteeism Control," Personnel Journal, Vol. 60, No. 5
(May 19 81), p. 387.
^^Ibid., p. 387.
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possible only to the extent that causes of absenteeism (1) can
be identified, and (2) are subject to control by the organiza-
17
tion. To them, absenteeism is generally caused by problems
of employee ability and motivation to attend. Specific examples
of factors influencing ability to attend work include (1) ill-
18
ness, (2) injury, and (3) transportation. One technique now
being applied by many organizations to motivate higher employee
19
attendance is a positive reinforcement system.
Positive reinforcement occurs when a stimulus (rein¬
forcer) is made contingent upon exhibition of a desired behavior
and when the contingency serves to increase the probability of
20
that behavior occurring in the future. The reinforcer can
be administered in different patterns, called reinforcement
schedules. In a continuous schedule, the reinforcer is given
after every desired behavior. In partial schedules, reinforce¬
ment does not occur after every desired behavior. Rather, it
is selectively administered either on a fixed basis or on a
variable basis.
Steve W. Panyon and Michael McGregor, in their article
"How to Implement A Proactive Incentive Plan: A Field Study"
17
Loretta M. Schmitz and Herbert G. Heneman III, "Do
Positive Reinforcement Programs Reduce Employee Absenteeism?"







examine the results of investigating some specific and syste¬
matic relationships between incentive plans and the reduction
of absenteeism and sick leave use. Panyan and McGregor utilize
the Plainview Christmas bonus plan to demonstrate the dramatic
results of an incentive plan—over a period of time—reducing
absenteeism by two-thirds.
Plainview, Texas is a city of 20,000 people with a city
22
labor force of 150 employees. Even though absenteeism had
been comparatively low in Plainview from 1967 to 1970 approxi¬
mately 3.7 days per year per employee compared to a national
range of 8 to 12 days, the city administration initiated an
incentive program to reduce absenteeism further and reward
23
employees who attended work regularly.
The Plainview plan consists of paying $10.00 per day
for each unused sick leave day that is not elgiible for transfer
to accxjmulated sick leave, not to exceed $60.00. To be eligible,
an employee must have worked for the City of Plainview a minimum
of thirteen months on October 1 and must be employed on the date
24
of payment. The employees are paid their bonus at Christmas.
The Plainview Christmas bonus incentive system shows
encouraging result. In 1969, the last year under preincentive
system conditions, 3.59 days per employee per year of sick leave
22
Steve W. Panyan and Michael M. McGregor, "How to Imple¬
ment A Proactive Incentive Plan: A Field Stucy," Personnel




were used. During the first year (1970) of the incentive plan
. 25
this figure dropped to 2.24.
According to Panyon and McGregor, important factors in
considering the adoption of any proactive incentive for
absenteeism or other target behaviors are: (1) Select a target
objective which is meaningful and measurable; (2) In estab¬
lishing an incentive progreim, management must be careful to
reserve the reward for exceptional performance; (3) Management
should intermittently survey employee opinions on program
operation and changes that must be implemented; (4) Management
should be careful of offsetting incentive procedures, for
example, giving bonuses for exceptional performance while
otherwise treating employees in a punitive or mechanistic
fashion.
Miriam Rothman, in her article, "Can Alternatives to
Sick Pay Plans Reduce Absenteeism?" argues that a well planned
alternative can reduce exploitation of sick leave benefits.
However, to achieve this, consideration shall be given to the
absenteeism rate experienced in the company as well as the
sick leave benefit plan used, when plans for staffing and pro¬
duction are developed.
Remedies that have been tried to deal with high employee
absenteeism, as Rothman points out, include: (1) Personal
holiday accumulation plan which is being used by the Peugot
^®Ibid., p. 461.
11
and Citroen automobile companies in France. The plan pro-
\
vides an opportunity to earn extra days off with pay for good
27
attendance. The plan is based on a point system. (2) Be¬
havior modification program instituted in Mobile, Alabama, by
Scott Paper Company. The company reduced their 7 percent rate
of absenteeism to 4.4 percent in five years by following a five-
step disciplinary progrcim, which resulted in the dismissal of
28
seventy delinquent workers. (3) Sick leave bank which allows
employees to deposit a set portion of their earned sick leave
days into a company pool. An application for withdrawal from
the sick leave bank may be made if an employee uses all of his/
29her compensated sick leave. (4) Monthly lottery which was
instituted by a chain of hardware stores with a $25.00 appliance
as the prize and color television set as the grand prize. Eli-
/
gibility was limited to employees with perfect attendance and
punctuality.^^ The results were remarkable. Sick pay payments
were reduced 62 percent and absenteeism and tardiness were
31
reduced 25 percent compared to the previous year.
Karl Van Asselt, in his article, "Why not a Rational
Sick Leave Policy?" notes that although absenteeism is epidemic
27
Miriam Rothman, "Can Alternatives to Sick Pay Plans











among local public works departments, that head-on confronta¬
tion with the problem has yielded positive results. To him,
there is need for a sick leave program,
... that will provide employees with wage continua¬
tion during illness, and will not, in and of itself,
create employee attitudes that will lead to abuse
of the privilege.32
Asselt indicates some local governments that have started to
deal with trends that lead to absenteeism problem. They include
(1) Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC), (2) The
City of Baltimore, and (3) Glencoe, Illinois, Public Works
Department.
The WSSC Plan involves a "ho cash" plan. The plan per¬
mits all permanent full-time employees to receive 4.6 hours of
sick leave credit for every two-week period amounting to fifteen
days a year. To receive the credit, the employee must have
33
worked the entire pay period.
Results of the WSSC "no cash" plan: The plan resulted
in a dramatic turnaround in the pattern of sick leave taken by
hourly employees since July 1978 when the WSSC policy went into
effect. In 1976, 23 percent of all workers took 48 hours or
less of leave, 4 percent took 49-56 hours, 3 percent took 57-
64 hours and 70 percent took 65 hours or more. In calendar
year 1979, 60 percent took 48 hours or less, 4 percent took 49-
56 hours, 7 percent took 57-64 hours and 29 percent took more
32
Karl L. Van Asselt, "Why Not A Rational Sick Leave
Policy?" American City and County (April 1980), p. 51.
^^Ibid., p. 52.
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than 65 hours out of work. In essence, there was a 29 percent
34
reduction in overall leave taken.
The City of Baltimore, Maryland chose the three Department
of Public Works (DPW) divisions where absenteeism was highest:
Highway Maintenance, Utilities Maintenance, and Sanitation, to
experiment with the new programs. Only administration differed
in all three divisions. Policies and procedures were kept the
same.
1. Highway Maintenance - Here an Absentee
Monitor was chosen, a chart was posted
conspicuously in each yard, the Absentee
Control Officer spoke to employee and
made follow-up visits to each yard;
2. Utilities Maintenance - Here, the Absentee
control Officer only met with the Division
Chief and the Yard Superintendent; and
3. Sanitation - Here, the Absentee Control
Officer met with supervisors, not with
employees, no monitor was named and no
follow-up visits were undertaken.35
The results of the program show that in the first six
month of the program absenteeism in the Highway Maintenance
Division dropped from 11.49 percent to 7.67 percent (a 33 per¬
cent decrease). In Utilities Maintenance, absenteeism declined
from 8.58 percent to 6.97 percent (nearly 19 percent decrease).







(nearly 14 percent decrease).
The Glencoe# Illinois program implemented in the Public
Works Department, mandated that employees must work the full
scheduled working days before and after any holiday in order
to be eligible for holiday pay. However, if employees are
legitimately ill during the above periods, they are mandated
to produce a doctor's note certifying their illness; other-
37
wise, they will not be paid.
In Glencoe's System, occurrences, not days are considered.
Each employee receives eight hours of paid sick leave each
month in which he or she worked at least eighty hours. Each
employees starts out a month with five credits; each occurrence
of absence the loss of one credit. Employees who accumulate
two absence occurrences in excess of earned monthly credits
receive a written warning from the supervisor. One more occur¬
rence results in a five day suspension and another occurrence
38
can result in an employee termination.
The program has cut public works department absences from
39
an average of eleven a month in 1973 to six a month in 1978.
Frank E. Kuzmits, in his article "How Good Is your Absen¬







organization absenteeism control system is, that one should
begin with an indepth audit of the policies, procedures,
-practices and attitudes that influence whether an employee
decides to come to work or stay away.
A good leave policy, therefore, is one of that
promotes high levels of regular, consistent at¬
tendance. It is written to recognize both
management's critical need for a reliable work¬
force and the employee's infrequent need to be
away from work, and it is fair, enforceable, and
agreeable to both management and labor.
For the most part, the City of Atlanta's policies and pro¬
cedures are compatible with these goals and ideals. However,
the city's policies and procedures, as the sick leave policies
in most local governments, include a policy that Kuzmits finds
"particularly tro\jblesome." This is the policy of offering
paid sick leave. Kuzmits believes that this policy often
results in sick leave being used for purposes contrary to its
original intent and reinforcing the employee's belief that
sick leave is a right or something owed to him or her rather
than a privilege or an optional benefit provided by the em-
n 41ployer.
Studies and publications indicate that numerous approaches
have been utilized by other governments; local, state and
40
Frank E. Kuzmits, "How Good Is your Absenteeism Con¬
trol System?" Advanced Management Journal. Vol. 45, No. 1




federal, including some private organizations to con^at the
kind of problem currently faced by the City of Atlanta—high
absenteeism and possible sick leave abuse. Such approaches
include attendance incentive programs, punitive actions,
better administration and control, combination leave, and/or
a "No Fault" sick leave policy.
The "Get Tough" Approach
Frequently, one of the first reactions by an organization
to a sick leave abuse or chronic absenteeism is to assume a
42
"get tough" approach. Such strategy normally involves the
application of stronger sanctions with respect to sick leave
usage or the more stringent enforcement of already existing
sanctions. Some aspects of the "get tough" approach may in¬
clude: (1) a greater scrutiny of employee leave records;
(2) The issuance of warning to employees whose leave use rates
are considered unacceptable; (3) Requiring employees suspected
of sick leave abuse to document single or odd day absences with
a medical certificate; (4) Requiring that sick leave be re¬
quested by employees in written form with approval by the super
visor rather than being granted automatically; and (5) Imposing
43
loss-^f-day penalties on abusers of sick leave.
42
Frederick I. Gundet, Solving the Problems of Employee





Depending on the organization, all or a combination of
these actions may be initiated as a means of controlling sick
leave abuse. Also, punitive actions could be taken in con¬
junction with other approaches not mentioned above.
One of the chief questions about any sick leave program is
whether incentive or the threat of punishment—in other words,
consistent and diligent enforcement- is more effective in
44
achieving long-term reductions in absenteeism. In a study
of one city conducted by the University of Southern California,
it was indicated that the degree of enforcemeht of a sick leave
policy seemed far more influential in reducing absenteeism than
incentive systems, which the study maintained, appeared to
45
have a limited, short-term effect. In addition, the study
indicated that incentive programs cost a lot of money. For
example, Boston spent $1.1 million in incentive to discourage
46
sick leave usage in fiscal year 1979.
Improved Administration and Control
From an administrative or managerial standpoint, there
are several things an organization can do to attack the problems
of absenteeism without having to rely substantially on punitive








sanctions or attendance program incentives. Below are five
components believed to constitute an administratively sound
absenteeism control system.
First, a written absenteeism policy that defined the
limits to which an employee can stay away from work without
fear of disciplinary action. Although many organizations have
written absenteeism policies, they do not address what is to
be considered an acceptable or unacceptable behavior in this
regard. For the most part, these policies indicate only the
amount of leave available and the procedures that must be
followed in accessing it.
Second, written objectives and strategies that focus on
the control of employee absenteeism. Absenteeism objectives
should be set at a level much less than the maximum days
allowed in the policy.
Third, discipline and reward that formally recognize
both good and bad attendance.
Fourth, supervisory practices foster a high attendance
environment. Such practices are characterized by fair and
just dealing with employees concerning all aspects of thfe work
environment, democratic rather than autocratic leadership styles
and a willingness to represent employees before upper management.
47
Frank E. Kuzmits, "How Good is Your Absenteeism Control
System?", p. 7.
19
Quality supervision may be one of the most important
factors affecting an employee's overall job satis¬
faction- and thus his or her desire to attend work
regularly. °
Fifth, an absenteeism control information system that
(1) compares actual absenteeism for the period against
absenteeism for the period against absenteeism goals for in¬
dividuals, work groups, departments and the entire organiza¬
tion; (2) provide data on a timely and efficient manner; and
(3) identify employees who require immediate management at-
49
tention.
Increased Vacation, Reduced Sick Leave, and the Sick Leave Bank
This plan involves reducing the sick leave allowance and
adding this reduction to the empllyee's vacation. The remainder
of the sick leave is placed in a sick leave bank in thfe case
of long-time illness.
The "No Fault" Strategy
The "no fault" strategy is a new form of absenteeism
policy that attempts to overcome many of the deficiencies
associated with traditional approaches to controlling absenteeism.
The system recognizes four factors that contribute to high morale,




50Miriam Rothman, pp. 789-790.
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(1) Satisfying work condition, (2) Sound group relations,
(3) People-oriented leadership styles, and (4) Positive work
ethics.Under the no fault approach, management recognizes
thfe inevitability of an occasional absence and avoids the com-
52
mon tendency to blame the employee for not coming to work.
With this method, there are no excused or unexcused absences.
No-fault enables the management to record each absence as one
occurrence, regardless of length. For instance, one occurrence
is recorded for both the employee who is absent Wednesday, and
53
the employee who is absent Monday through Wednesday. Why the
disparity in recording absences? (1) To avoid penalizing the
employee who, on an infrequent basis, is genuinely ill and
could not come to work, (2) To place greater penalty upon the
"chronic" absentee who claims large numbers of single-day
absences.
The type of organizational setting that no-fault appears
to be suitable are; (1) organizations plagued with excessive
absenteeism, particularly the single-day variety, which signi¬
fies that absence is not illness-related, (2) organizations
where part absences are causing significant disruptions in
Frank E. Kuzmits, "No Fault; A New Strategy for Absen¬








scheduling and coordinating work. Part absences are tardiness
and leave work early, (3) organizations with minimal opportuni¬
ties that could improve attendance, (4) organizations where
labor leaders accept and support the no-fault concept, and
(5) organizations with need to implement absence-related dis¬
cipline more fairly and uniformly.
55 Ibid. p. 390.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This study will attempt to answer the following four ques¬
tions; (1) Does the City of Atlanta have a sick leave abuse
problem? (2) Is the sick leave bonus plan effective in con¬
trolling sick leave usage? (3) Are there more cost-effective
alternatives the city can implement to control or reduce sick
leave usage and/or abuse? (4) Should the sick leave bonus plan
be modified, discontinued altogether or maintained in its cur¬
rent form?
The research that comprises this study was derived from
surveys, questionnaires, analysis of City of Atlanta sick leave
usage and bonus participation data, review of City (Atlanta)
documents, Ordinances, and literature and periodicals on sick
leave usage, abuse, incentive and disciplinary programs. A
total of three surveys were conducted during the course of the
study. First, other local governments such as Denver, Detroit,
and Minneapolis were surveyed on their.sick leave programs and
experiences. Second, twenty-six City of Atlanta agencies were
canvassed on their administrative practices with respect to
sick leave. Third, a questionnaire was administered of one hun¬
dred-fifty City of Atlanta employees to solicit their attitudes
on sick leave usage and the sick leave bonus plan. Fourth, a
random sample of one hundred of city employees were tciken from
all categories from the 1982 printout on sick leave usage in
order to determine the extent to which the city may be affected
by possible sick leave abuse.
22
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The Sick leave usage and bonus participation data that was
analyzed concentrates on a five year period 1978 - 1982. How¬
ever, references were ocassionally made covering the entire
span of its existence beginning from 1970. The data has a
minor limitation in that it covers only those employees who
are on thh City's payroll at the end of the twenty-fourth pay
period. Nevertheless, the employees affected and the amount
of sick leave involved are not considered to be significant
enough to invalidate any conclusions that might be drawn from
the analysis if the sick leave data.
V. SICK LEAVE USAGE IN THE
CITY OF ATLANTA
As indicated earlier, over $26 billion a year is spent
nationally on absenteeism. Statistics indicate that about
two-thirds of all absences are due to illness and injury,
and about one-third is due to personal and civic reasons.
The City of Atlanta ranks higher among local governments
questioned on their average sick days per employee per
year.
Sick Leave Days and
Cost from 1978 - 1982
Since 1978, the cost of sick leave usage has increased
annually. From $2.96 million in 1978 to $3.78 million in
1982. This represents an increase of $820,000 or 28 percent
over the five-year period. Because total days taken in
sick leave has actually declined over this period, the
increase in sick leave cost can be assviraed to have resulted
from salary increases.
Table 1 summarizes the sick leave usage statistics in
the City of Atlanta from 1978 - 1982.
56




SICK LEAVE USE 1978 - 1982
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Total Days Used 69,871 65,546 59,220 57,818 60,318
No. of Positions 1,763 8,271 7,904 7,431 7,431
Days/Positions 8.0 7.9 7.5 7.7 8.1
Days/Positions of
those taking sick
leave 10.1 9.7 9.9 9.9 10.2
Cost (Millions) $2.96 $3.03 $3.30 $3.43 $3.78
i
Source: Sick Leave Use Printout for the City of Atlanta
For Years 1978 - 1982.
Distribution of Sick Leave Usage
In order to enhance the analysis of how sick leave usage is
distributed among City of Atlanta employees, this inquiry will
be approached from three different angles. First, a look at
the percentage of employees taking a certain number of days
each year; second, a review of possible sick leave abuse by
determining the percentage of city employees engaged in a single
day and/or Monday and/or Friday absences; and finally, a
review of sick days taken by respective salary range classifica¬
tions .
By reviewing the sick leave usage printouts provided by the
Management Systems Office, it becaune clear to the writer that
there i.s an apparent high sick day usage eunong city employees.
The number of sick days used annually were grouped into
four distinct categories: Zero days, 1 to 4 days; 5 to 9
26
days, and 10 days or more. As the data indicated, the per¬
centage of employees taking 10 days or more annually rank
highest every year in each of the five year period; 1978-1982
(see Table 2).
TABLE 2
ANNUAL SICK LEAVE USE BY FOUR CATEGORIES
Days 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Zero Days 20.7% 18.1% 24.1% 22.1% 20.2%
1-4 Days 16.0% 18.2% 15.0% 16.4% 16.3%
5-9 Days 26.6% 28.2% 25.1% 25.6% 26.2%
10 plus 36.7% 35.5% 35.8% 35.9% 37.3%
Source: Sick Leave Use Printout for the City of
Atlanta tot Years 1978 - 1982
To determine the extent to which the city may be affected
by possible sick leave abuse a random sample of one hundred posi¬
tions from all categories of city employees was taken from the
1982 printout on sick leave usage. The result is not too sur¬
prising. Fifty-seven percent (57 percent) of all sick days
used by employees in that year was taken on a Friday or Monday.
An even distribution of sick leave use would have resulted in a
rate of 20 percent for all days, Monday through Friday (see
table 3).
A review of sick leave use by salary range suggests a
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TABLE 3
SINGLE DAY ABSENCE BY DAY OF THE WEEK-
ALL JOB CATEGORIES SAMPLED
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total
Percent 33 16 13 14 24 100
Source: Sick Leave Use Printout for the City of Atlanta
For 1982
trend of heavier use in the lower ranges. Two salary range
groups in the lower echelon have an annual use average greater
than the city-wide average of 8.1 days. They are salary ranges
57
50 to 54 and 55 to 59. Although not as significant, salary
ranges 45 to 49, 60 to 64, and 65 to 69 have comparably high
annual average as opposed to the higher salary ranges of 70 to
90. Rate of pay and level of responsibility may account for the
low sick leave use for employees and officers in the higher
salary range (see I&ble 4).
^^1982 Printout for Sick Leave Usage for the City
of Atlanta,
TABLE 4











40-44 $ 6,700- 7,600 7 20 2.9
45-49 7,900- 9,100 98 786 8.0
50-54 9,400-10,800 1622 15,507 9.6
55-69 11,300-13,000 1570 14,591 9.3
70-74 13,500-15,700 2389 17,004 7.1
75-79 16,300-19,000 1247 9,939 8.0
80-84 19,800-23,100 252 1,347 5.3
85-90 24,000-28,700 163 897 5.5
90 plus 29,300-34,400 54 177 3.3
35,800-42,00 27 48 1.8
$43,700 2 3.5 1.8
Total 7431 60,320 8.1
Source: Sick Leave Use Printout for the City of Atlanta of 1982
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Survey of Twenty-Six Departments
In an attempt to get a cross-sectional sample of the
administrative practices in the City of Atlanta government,
the writer conducted a survey of twenty-six departments,
bureaus, or agencies in 1982. An analysis of.that survey pro¬
vides, the following findings;
(1) Although 92 percent of the respondents
indicated that an employee was sup¬
posed to call in sick to one specific
person, no consistency existed as to
who that person should be. The most
frequent response was the employee's
immediate supervisor. Other persons
mentioned were a secretary, bureau
or agency director, or a combination
of both.
(2) Only 73 percent of the respondents had
a time limit for calling in sick and
of those who did, the time varied from
fifteen minutes before the start of
work to an hour-and-a-half after the
start of work.
(3) Only 50 percent of the respondents
required a sick leave form to be com¬
pleted, and all of those forms were
different.
(4) More than 50 percent of the respondents
indicated that no employee was discip¬
lined for sick leave abuse in 1981 in
their departments or agencies, even
though they admitted there were eviden¬
ces of abuses. (See Appendix A for a
sample of the survey)
Comparison of Sick Leave Use
and General Rules and Regulations
in the City of Atlanta With Those
of Other Local Government^
In reviewing the responses of the twenty local government
survey in 1982 with respect to their sick leave uses and prac¬
tices, some similarities and dissimilarities with that of the
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City of Atlanta were identified. The similarities are as
follows:
(1) the thirteen days of sick leave per
year allowed by the City of Atlanta is
approximately the same as that provid¬
ed by a majority of other governments;
(2) the purposes of which the City grants
sick leave are consistent with the
practices of the majority of others;
and
(3) there are similarities as to when docu¬
mentation for sick leave use may be
required.
On the other hand, there are dissimilarities in the follow'
ing areas:
(1) Unlike the City of Atlanta, a very limi¬
ted number of the local governments (25
percent) make cash reimbursement to their
employees for unused sick days. The
majority of the local governments (75 per¬
cent) make their employees apply their
unused sick days toward their retirement
or to convert them into vacation;
(2) the average number of sick days used per
employee in the City of Atlanta is higher
than that of a majority of the local govern¬
ments. (See Appendix B)
VI. EVALUATION OF CITY’S SICK LEAVE BONUS PROGRAM
From analyzing the five-year period (1978-1982) print¬
outs for city's bonus participation, it has become apparent
to the writer that the city's sick leave bonus plan (SLBP)
has failed to provide any incentive for most employees to con¬
serve their sick days, especially those employees in the lower
strata of the city government. In order to provide a comprehen¬
sive analysis, the writer will approach this section by first
presenting an overview of the city's SLBP, encompassing its
costs and recipients. Then, analysis aimed at determining the
effectiveness of the bonus plan in controlling sick leave usage
will be presented.
Since its inception in 1970, the city's SLBP has remained
unchanged despite consistent criticism of its ineffectiveness
in achieving objectives. After thirteen years withoutmajor posi¬
tive impact, the writer is convinced that modifications are
necessary in order to alleviate the loopholes incumbent in the
plan.
Costs
Since the SLBP was implemented in 1970, the sick leave
bonus amount has increased both in gross amount and the average
payment per employee. The gross bonus amount increased from
58
$182,623 in 1970 to $450,508 in 1982, a 157 percent increase.
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In contrast, except for a slight increase in 1982, the number
of employees receiving bonus has continued to decrease since
1975.
In essence, it appears that each year approximately the
same group of employees are receiving an,increasingly larger
bonus due to the fact that they are higher on the salary
scale than the previous year and therefore earning a higher
daily salary rate (see Graph 1).
Recipients
The recipients of sick leave bonus pay are those employees
and/or officers who receive in cash each year by December 25
for one-fourth of the accumulated sick leave beyond the re¬
quired thirty days. The other three-fourths above thirty days
are added to the sick leave reserve fund for such employee or
officer.
Similar to the approach used to determine the sick leave
usages, the bonus recipients are analyzed by grouping them into
five salary range categories:
Range 42 to 55 include such positions as
clerks, clerk messengers, college interns,
laborers, consumer affairs counselors, and
golf professionals.
Range 56 to 65 encompasses admin'strative
secretaries, administrative assistants,
automotive mechanics, construction inspec¬
tors, and claims investigator aides.
Range 66 to 75 includes court counselors,
operation supervisors, planners, analysts,
librarians, and coordinators.
59Charter and Code, City of Atlanta, Georgia, pp. 5-40.
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Range 76 to 85 encompasses managers, deve¬
lopment assistants, assistant attorneys,
and cleric of councils.
Range 86 to 95 includes directors, divi¬
sion bureaus, city attorneys, chief admin¬
istrative officers, and fire chiefs.
The results of the above categorization suggest that
30.48 percent of the 1982 recipients were employees or offi¬
cers who occupied positions that necessitated that they be
at work constantly whether bonus plan existed or not. More¬
over, these individuals because of their positions could stay
absent from work for other "outside the office related commit¬
ments" instead of calling in sick. These positions fall
between range 66-95. (See Graphs 2 and 3)
In addition, although only 30.48 percent of employees
who received bonus pay in 1982 were in range 66 to 95, they
received more than 42 percent of the total or gross bonus
amount paid out that year. The high salary for such employ¬
ees was the main reason for the disparity. (See Histograms
1, 2, and 3 below)
Effectiveness of City's SLBP In
Controlling Sick Leave Usage
Because of insufficient sick leave use data to define the
nature of the sick leave problem in the city prior to the iitple-
mentation of SLBP and the lack of any control group design
studies having been done, it is slightly difficult to assess
the effectiveness of the SLBP. Despite this apparent lack of
^^Ibid., pp. 5-40.3.
GRAPH 1
GROSS BONUS AMOUNT PAID
($000)
Source; Sick Leave Use and Bonus Participation printout for City of Atlanta
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GRAPH 2
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES RECEIVING BONUS
(000)
Source; Sick Leave Use and Bonus Participation printout for City of Atlanta
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GRAPH 3
BONUS AMOUNT PER EMPLOYEE
($00)
Source: Sick Leave Use and Bonus Participation printout for City of Atlanta
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information, some evidence does exist to substantiate the sus¬
pect of the effectiveness of the city's sick leave bonus plan.
First, as noted earlier, the average sick leave use of city
employee exceeds that of many other cities and local govern¬
ments including those that do not have any cash-in reward for
unused sick leave. Second, based on a random sample survey
of city employees on their attitudes about sick leave use and
the SLBP, some 53.5 percent of the relevant employees survey¬
ed indicated that the SLBP did not have an effect on their
sick leave use. Only 11.6 percent of the relevant employees
surveyed indicated that SLBP was a factor in their decreasing
their sick leave use.
Two schools of opinion emerged from this study as to why
the SLBP is not an effective incentive to regular work atten¬
dance. First, the structure of the sick leave bonus plan.
The city requires good attendance for at least three conse¬
cutive years before an employee can qualify for sick leave
bonus. Consequently, the employee that has achieved the
desired level of attendance is awarded the bonus on an annual
basis. This stipulation is more of a disincentive than an
incentive.
Studies by behavioral scientists suggest that in order
to reinforce a desired action, for example, good work attten-
dance, that the reward for it should follow as closely as pos-
61
sible the performance of the action. If that is correct,
^^Predrick J. Gaudet, Solving the Problems of Employee
Absence (New York; American Management Association, Inc.,
1963), p. 26.
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then the three consecutive year good attendance requirement
for City of Atlanta employees lacks a potential reinforcement
technique to accomplish its objective—limited or no sick
leave use.
The second school of thought is concerned with the amount
of cash employees receive for good attendance. Currently,
employees receive only one-fourth day's pay for sick days
over thirty days not used. That may not compare favorably
with the benefits derived by an employee from using a sick
day when he or she is not really ill. A majority of the
employees surveyed indicated that the one-fourth day's pay is
too small to serve as an incentive to attend work regularly.
(See Appendix C for a sample of Sick Leave. Questionnaire of
City of Atlanta Employees)
HISTOGRAM 1
PERCENTAGE OF BONUS RECIPIENTS BY FIVE RANGE CATEGORIES
Percents
Source: Bonus Participation Printout For the City of Atlanta
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HISTOGRAM 2








Source: Bonus Participation Printout for the City of Atlanta
HISTOGRAM 3
Source:
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS BONUS AMOUNT RECEIVED BY
TWO BROAD RANGE CATEGORIES
60-
Bonus Participation Printout for the City of Atlanta
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusive points can be made with respect to
the City's sick leave bonus plan, however, for the purpose of
clarity, the writer has chosen to present them in nine independent
statements:
1. The SLBP has failed to act as an incentive to conserve
sick leave. After declining for the first four years,
both total sick days used and sick days used per employee
have continued to increase.
2. The pattern of sick days used suggests some employees
may be abusing their sick leave privileges. In a random
sample of all job categories from 1982 sick leave usage
printout, 57 percent of the sick days used by employees
were taken on a Friday and/or Monday.
3. The heavier use of sick leave is concentrated in the
lower salaried or office clerical, and service maintenance
workers.
4. Sick leave cost represents a significant expense to the
city. The monetary expense of sick leave used has in¬
creased annually since 1978 from $2.96 to $3.78 million
in 1982, an increase of $820,000 or 28.0 percent over
the five year period.
5. While the number of recipients receiving the sick leave
has decreased, the cost of bonus, due to the growth in
city salaries has increased. In 1982, the City paid




6. No consistency exists among city departments or agencies
with respect to sick leave adm.inistration. Employees
call in sick at different times, may or may not have to
complete sick leave use foinms, and may or may not be
disciplined for abusing their leave depending on which
department or agency they work for.
7. The City’s average sick days used per employee ranks
higher than most comparable cities. In 1982, the average
sick days used per employee in the City of Atlanta was
8.1, while Denver, Detroit and Minneapolis have 7.10,
6,04 and 3,58 days respectively.
8. The City's policy of an accumulation of thirty days prior
to qualifying for bonus pay is too lengthy.
One-forth in cash of the unused sick days after thirty




Before proceeding with the study's reconunendations, it is
quite in order to caution that they may not serve as panacea
for a total elimination of sick leave use or apparent sick
leave abuse. However, the writer believes that if properly
instituted these recommendations can substantively improve the
sick leave use problem in the Atlanta City Government. These
recommendations were derived from what can safely be referred
to as the setbacks of the city's sick leave bonus plan since
its inception thirteen years ago.
New sick Leave Policies and Procedures
The writer is convinced that in order to install accoun¬
tability into the present sick leave system, the city
needs to adopt a more comprehensive and specific set of sick
leave policies and procedures. The target must be to insti¬
tute some consistency of sick leave policies and procedures
into the present system as well as uniform methods of record¬
keeping and standards for what is considered acceptable use
of sick leave. If properly iii5>lemented, these changes could
lead to the following:
(1) Clarity in the city's policies with respect to




(2) Clarity in the city's policies with respect to
the duties and responsibilities of supervisory personnel in
the administration of sick leave;
(3) Specific procedures that must be followed by all
employees and supervisors that are consistent in all city
departments; and
(4) Specific disciplinary action that will be forth¬
coming for specific or definite types of abuse and the docu¬
mentation that needs to be kept by supervisory personnel to
substantiate charges.
A Standardized Reporting System
The primary purpose of implementing a standardized
reporting system is to generate valid usage data that can be
utilized to develop performance standards for individuals and
departments. These performance standards should help identify
problem areas in the administration of the program.
The two major components of such a system are; (1)
the use of standardized reporting forms; and (2) periodic
computer analysis of the data reported in order to identify
the incidence and extent of sick leave abuse (if any) and to
indicate a course of action to deal with problems that are
identified.
By analyzing sick leave and other absence data on a
regular basis, causes can be ascribed to sickness absence in
order to determine what to do to rectify the situation. As
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put by one writer,
If the individual employee is at fault, then the
control of absence becomes a relatively simple
matter of selection and correction-or weeding out-
of the chronic absentees. But if poor supervision
is causing the trouble, the solution is more diffi¬
cult. More careful selection of management person¬
nel is indicated ... more realistically, the situa¬
tion calls for retraining supervisors and changes
in practices.®^
New Bonus Plan
Another recommendation the city must consider is to
adopt a bonus alternative that will pay employees full amount
based on each employee's daily rate for all sick days saved
during a calendar year. This has the tendency to serve as a
reasonable incentive for sick leave conservation than the
present program.
Eliminate Management Personnel from
Participating In the Bonus Plan
It is the conviction of the writer that the city can
harmlessly exclude all individuals in management level from
participating in the plan with little or no change in their
attendance rate to work. This is in line with the argument
that such officials have the tendency to attend work regularly
due to the nature of their task and responsibilities, coupled
with the fact that such officials can stay away from work at
their discretion for other reasons than being sick.
62
Fredrick J. Gaudet, p. 72.
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Eliminate the Bonus Plan Entirely
The final recommendation, and maybe the most stringent,
is that the bonus plan be totally eliminated. This involves a
complete eradication of the bonus plan while simultaneously
adopting a strict policy against sick leave abuse, stating
very clearly and in simple language the kind of disciplinary
actions all sick leave abusers must face.
APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF TWENTY-SIX DEPARTMENTS IN THE CITY OF ATLANTA
SICK LEAVE ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU, OR AGENCY NAME
CONTACT PERSON
TELEPHONE NUMBER
1. Does your department, bureau, and/or agency (please circle which)
follow specific procedures with respect to employees requesting
sick leave? YES NO
If NO, please go to #2
If YES, please answer the following:
a. Are your procedures uniform throughout the entire organization?
YES NO
b. What is the time span for employees to call in?
c. Who has to be notified that sick leave is being taken?
Name
Job Title
d. Is there a standard form used to record sick leave calls?
YES NO
If YES, please attach a copy.
2. What is the official department (or bureau or agency) definition
of sick leave abuse?
48





a. Standardized sick leave
report forms are com¬
pleted and periodical¬
ly monitored.
b. Employees are counse-
led if abuse is sus¬
pected .
c. Verbal reprimands are
given if a pattern of
abuse has been estab¬
lished.
d. Written reprimands
are placed in the
employee's file.







each illness in cer¬
tain instances.4.Other than those listed above, have you implemented any program
or policies to curb sick leave abuse? If yes, please explain.5.What sick leave records internal to your organization are kept on
each employee?
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6. Are employees ever allowed to substitute vacation days for sick
leave days?
YES NO
7. How would you characterize the administration of sick leave




(i.e., somewhere in between)
PLEASE ATTACH ANY DOCUMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO SICK LEAVE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES SPECIFIC TO YOUR ORGANIZATION.
APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF TWENTY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ON THEIR SICK LEAVE
PRACTICES AND EXPERIENCES
Sick Leave Survey - 19821.Name of Local Government: ■2.Do you have a program (i.e., cash payments, percentage of accumu¬
lated sick leave credited to retirement, unlimited sick leave
accumulation, etc.) designed to reward or encourage your employees
for not using their sick leave? a. b.3.If yes, please describe below or attach an explanation of the pro¬
gram:
4. Since implementation of program, has sick leave usage
a, Increased b. Decreased
c, Remained the same
5. To what extent is it available, please provide the following data
for the last five years before and the first five years after
institution of program and for the years 1975 through 1981 if they




































6. Presently, what is the number of sick days an employee may earn
per year?
7. If unlimited sick leave accumulation is not permitted, what is
the maximum number of sick days that can be accumulated?






SURVEY (QUESTIONNAIRE) OF RANDOMLY
SELECTED CITY OF ATUNTA EMPLOYEES IN REGARD TO
THE CITY'S SICK LEAVE BONUS PROGRAM
SICK LEAVE SURVEY
(QUESTIONNAIRE)
1. Sex: Male , Female
2. What is your age?
3. What is your present position?
4. How long have you been employed by the City of Atlanta?
5. Are you aware of the City's SICK LEAVE BONUS PROGRAM? Yes
No
Please see below the definition of the City's Sick Leave Bonus Program:
The City's Sick Leave Bonus Program provides that
once a City employee has saved up to 30 days in
sick leave, that employee will be paid annually
for 1/4 (one-quarter) of all days above the 30
days. The other 3/4 (three-quarters) above the 30
days would go into a sick leave reserve for that
employee in case of a long-term illness. For exam¬
ple, if an employee did not take a single day of
sick leave in 3 years, that employee would have 39
days saved in sick leave. The employee would then
be paid for 2 1/4 days and 6 3/4 days would go into
the sick leave reserve for that employee.
If you checked "YES" in question 5 go to question (6); if you checked
"NO" go to question 9.
6. How did you first find out about the Sick Leave Bonus Program?
(Please check one)




7. If you did not learn about it through job orientation, how long
did it take you to learn about the Sick Leave Bonus Program?8.Indicate the effect that the Sick Leave Bonus Program has had on
your sick leave usage. (Check boxes that apply to you)
No effect on my sick leave usage.
Decreased the number of days I have used as sick leave.
53
54
I now use vacation days instead of sick days in order
to qualify for the bonus.
Other (Please specify)9.Check the years, if any, in which you received a bonus check from
the City.
1982 1981 1980 1979 1978
None10.Would you like to see the Sick Leave Bonus Program remain the same
or changed? (Please check one)
Remain the same.
Changed. (Please specify)11.To what extent do any of the following affect your use of sick leave?
(Check boxes that apply to you).
(a) Relationship with
supervisor or boss: □ Often □ Sometimes Seldom/Never
(b) Relationship with i
co-workers: |□ Often □ Sometimes CH Seldom/Never
(c) Type of work: Q Often P Sometimes Q Seldom/Never
(d) Working conditions (for example. safety hazards. weather, etc.):
1□ Often □ Sometimes [*^ Seldom/Never
(e) Salary: j□ Often □ Sometimes Q Seldom/Never
if) Transportation to j
work: 1□ Often □ Sometimes Q Seldom/Never
(9) Personal illness/
sickness: □ Often □ Sometimes Q Seldom/Never
(h) Childcare: j□ Often □ Sometimes [3Seldom/Never
(i) Personal problems: j□ Often □ Sometimes 13Seldom/Never
(J) Others (Please specify:
1□ Often Q Sometimes 3 Seldom/Never
55
12. Please check below the changes that you would like to have made
to reduce sick leave usage.
Provide additional job training.
Improve working conditions. (Please specify)
Provide help with personal problems. (If you desire,
please specify type of help needed)
Other (Please specify)
None
13. Please indicate in the space provided below any additional comments
you may have regarding the City's Sick Leave Bonus Program and/or
other areas relating to sick leave usage. (You may also use back
of page.)
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